[Django]-How to make sure that my AJAX requests are originating from the same server in Python

by

7👍

✅

Depending on your infrastructure @dragonx’s answer might interest you most.

my 2c

You want to make sure that only if a client visits your website can use the api? Hmm does the bot, robot, crawler fall in the same category with the client then? Or am I wrong? This can be easily exploited in case you really want to secure it really.

I cannot believe I’m the only person with this requirement.

Maybe not, but as you can see you are prone to several attacks to your API and that can be a reason for someone not sharing your design and making security stricter with auth.

EDIT

Since we are talking about AJAX requests what does the IP part has to do with this? The IP will always be the Client’s IP! So probably, you want a public API…

  • I would Go with the tokens/session/cookie part.

  • I ‘d go with a generated token that lasts a little while and a flow described below.

  • I’d go with a limiter per some time, like Github does. Eg 60 requests per hour per ip or more for registered users

To overcome the problem with the refreshing token I would just do this:

  1. Client visits the site

    -> server generates API TOKEN INIT

    -> Client gets API TOKEN INIT which is valid only for starting 1 request.

  2. Client makes AJAX Request to API

    -> Client uses API TOKEN INIT

    -> Server checks against API TOKEN INIT and limits

    -> Server accepts request

    -> Server passes back API TOKEN

    -> Client consumes response data and stores API TOKEN for further usage (Will be stored in browser memory via JS)

  3. Client Starts Comm with the API for a limited amount of time or requests. Notice that you know also the init token date so you can use it to check against the 1st visit on the page.

The 1st token is generated via the server when the client visits.
Then the client uses that token in order to obtain a real one, that lasts for some time or something else as of limitation.
This makes someone actually visit the webpage and then he can access the API for a limit amount of time, requests perhaps etc.

This way you don’t need refreshing.

Of course the above scenario could be simplified with only one token and a time limit as mentioned above.

Of course the above scenario is prone to advanced crawlers, etc since you have no authentication.

Of course a clever attacker can grab tokens from server and repeat the steps but, then you already had that that problem from start.

Some extra points

  • As the comments provided please close writes to the API. You don’t want to be a victim of DOS attacks with writes if you have doubts about your implementation(if not use auth) or for extra security
  • The token scenario as described above can also become more complicated eg by constantly exchanging tokens

Just for reference GAE Cloud storage uses signed_urls for kind of the same purpose.

Hope it helps.

PS. regarding IP spoofing and Defense against spoofing attacks wikipedia says so packet’s won’t be returned to the attacker:

Some upper layer protocols provide their own defense against IP
spoofing attacks. For example, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
uses sequence numbers negotiated with the remote machine to ensure
that arriving packets are part of an established connection. Since the
attacker normally can’t see any reply packets, the sequence number
must be guessed in order to hijack the connection. The poor
implementation in many older operating systems and network devices,
however, means that TCP sequence numbers can be predicted.

👤Jimmy Kane

6👍

If it’s purely the same server, you can verify requests against 127.0.0.1 or localhost.

Otherwise the solution is probably at the network level, to have a separate private subnet that you can check against. It should be difficult for an attacker to spoof your subnet without being on your subnet.

👤dragonx

5👍

I guess you’re a bit confused (or I am, please correct me). That your JS code is published on the same server as your API does not mean AJAX requests will come from your server. The clients download the JS from your server and execute it, which results in requests to your API sent from the clients, not from the same server.

Now if the above scenario correctly describes your case, what you are probably trying to do is to protect your API from bot scraping. The easiest protection is CAPTCHA, and you can find some more ideas on the Wiki page.

If you are concerned that other sites may make AJAX calls to your API to copy your site functionality, you shouldn’t be–AJAX requests can only be sent to the same server as the page the JS is running on, unless it is JSONP.

👤jwalker

4👍

Short answer: It is not possible to prevent a dedicated attacker.

You have no method of identifying a client other than with the information that they give you. For instance, username/password authentication works under the assumption that only a valid client would be able to provide valid credentials. When someone logs in, all you know is that some person provided those credentials — you assume that this means that this means that they are a legitimate user.

Let’s take a look at your scenario here, as I understand it. The only method you have of authenticating a client is IP Address, a very weak form of authentication. As you stated, this can be easily spoofed, and in with some effort your server’s response can be received back to the attacker’s original IP address. If this happens, you can’t do anything about it. The fact is, if you assume someone from a valid IP address is a valid user, then spoofers and legitimate users are indistinguishable. This is just like if someone steals your password and tries to log in to StackOverflow. To StackOverflow, the attacker and you are indistinguishable, since all they have to go on is the username and password.

You can do fancy things with the client as mentioned in other answers, such as tokens, time limits, etc., but an dedicated attacker would be able to mimic the actions of a legitimate client, and you wouldn’t be able to tell them apart because they would both appear to be from valid IP addresses. For instance, in your last example, if I was an attacker looking to make API calls, I would spoof a legitimate IP address, get the signature, and use it to make an API call, just as a legitimate client would.

If your application is critical enough to deem this level of thought into security, you should at least think of implementing something like API tokens, public key encryption, or other authentication methods that are more secure than IP addresses to tell your clients apart from any attackers. Authentication by IP address (or other easily forged tokens like hostname or headers) simply won’t cut it.

👤Richard Ye

3👍

may be you could achieve this by using Same-origin policy

refer http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same_origin_policy

👤Venkatesh Bachu

3👍

As suggested by Venkatesh Bachu, Same Origin Policy and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-Origin_Resource_Sharing (CORS) could be used as a solution.
In your API, you can check Origin header and respond accordingly.
Need to check if Origin header can be modified by using extensions like tamper data.
A determined hacker can still snoop by pointing browser to a local proxy server.

👤Sameer Naik

3👍

If this app server is running on an ordinary web server that has configurable listening IP address, set it to 127.0.0.1. With the TCPServer module, it’s like

SocketServer.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 12345), TheHandlerClass)

Use netstat command to verify the listening address is correct as “127.0.0.1”

tcp4 0 0 127.0.0.1.12345 *.* LISTEN

This will effectively making any connection originated outside the same host impossible on the TCP level.

👤Ryan

2👍

There are two general solution types: in-band solutions using normal web server/client mechanisms, that are easy to implement but have limitations; and out-of-band solutions that rely on you to configure something externally, that take a little more work but don’t have the same limitations as in-band.

If you prefer an in-band solution, then the typical approach used to prevent cross-site request forgery (XSRF) would work well. Server issues a token with a limited life span; client uses the token in requests; privacy of token is (sort of) assured by using an HTTPS connection. This approach is used widely, and works well unless you are worried about man-in-the-middle attacks that could intercept the token, or buggy browsers that could leak data to other client-side code that’s being naughty.

You can eliminate those limitations, if you’re motivated, by introducing client certificates. These are kind of the flip side to the SSL certificates we all use on web servers — they operate the same way, but are used to identify the client rather than the server. Because the certificate itself never goes over the wire (you install it locally in the browser or other client), you don’t have the same threats from man-in-the-middle and browser leakage. This solution isn’t used much in the wild because it’s confusing to set up (very confusing for the typical user), but if you have a limited number of clients and they are under your control, then it could be feasible to deploy and manage this limited number of client certificates. The certificate operations are handled by the browser, not in client code (i.e. not in JavaScript) so your concern about key data being visible in JavaScript would not apply in this scenario.

Lastly, if you want to skip over the client configuration nonsense, use the ultimate out-of-band solution — iptables or a similar tool to create an application-level firewall that only allows sessions that originate from network interfaces (like local loopback) that you know for certain can’t be accessed off the box.

👤Chris Johnson

Leave a comment